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Legal Opacity: Artificial Intelligence's
Sticky Wicket
CharlotteA. Tschider

ABSTRACT: Proponents of artificial intelligence ("AI") transparency have
carefully illustratedthe many ways in which transparency may be beneficial
to prevent safety and unfairness issues, to promote innovation, and to

effectively provide recovery or support due process in lawsuits. However,
impediments to transparency goals, described as opacity, or the "black-box"
nature of AI, present significant issuesfor promoting these goals.
An undertheorizedperspective on opacity is legal opacity, where competitive,
and often discretionary legal choices, coupled with regulatory barrierscreate
opacity. Although legal opacity does not specifically affect Al only, the
combination of technical opacity in AI systems with legal opacity amounts to
a nearly insurmountablebarrierto transparencygoals. Types of legal opacity,
including trade secrecy status, contractual provisions that promote

confidentiality and data ownership restrictions, and privacy law
independently and cumulatively make the black box substantially opaquer.
The degree to which legal opacity should be limited or disincentivized depends
on the specific sector and transparency goals of specific AI technologies,
technologies which may dramatically affect people's lives or may simply be
introducedfor convenience. This Response proposes a contextual approach to

transparency:Legal opacity may be limited in situations where the individual
or patient benefits, when data sharing and technology disclosure can be

incentivized, or in a protected state when transparency and explanation are
necessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence ("AI") is a technology used in any number of
sectors, not just healthcare. Al can streamline the employment interview
process,' automate cafeteria ordering and prepare meals,2 enable driverless
delivery,3 reduce cost in transportation logistics,4 improve product
personalization,5 or increase medical diagnostic efficacy. A is built on big
data, data that may be personally identifiable, confidential, both, or simply
public data that an organization has invested considerable time to collect and
organize.'
Depending on the data and the system underlying the AI's goals,
technical issues may result in societal consequences and corresponding legal
repercussions. For example, an AI system may eliminate certainjob applicants
from an employment search based on a combination of resume information
and a video interview analysis.' A specific prison sentence could be
recommended to a judge based on data gathered from current and former
prisoners, as well as recidivism data.o Government agencies could allocate

i.
Patricia Farrell, Al's Secrets Behind That Job Interview: It's Not What You Did or Who You Are
but What AISays About You, MLFIUM (Nov. 9, 201g), https://drpafarrell.medium.com/ais-secrets
-behind-that-job-interview-it-s-not-what-you-did-or-who-you-are-but-what-ai-says-about- 5 3e98 5 8a

64f9 [https://perma.cc/AMU-EF3A].
2.
Kumba Sennaar, Examples ofAl in Restaurants and Food Services, EMERJ (Jan. 31, 2019), ht
tps://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-in-restaurants-food-services [https://perma.cc/778Z-B

88A].
3.

The FutureofDelivery is SelfDriving, DOM INOS, https://www.selfdrivingdelivery.dominos.c

om/en [https://perma.cc/H2 4 7-CBYA].
4. Vitaly Kuprenko, Artificial Intelligence in the Logistics Industry, THE NETWORK EFFECT (Sept.
23, 201g), https://supplvchainbevond.com/artificial-intelligence-in-the-logistics-industry [https:

//perma.cc/

55 L7-SZEP].
5.
Andrew Pearson, AI-A PersonalizationEngineon Steroids, MEDIUM (May 18, 2021), https
://medium.com/product-ai/ai-a-personalization-engine-on-steroids-dged5gec44f9
[https://per

na.cc/FFV 7 -FZX 5 ]6. Andrew Wade, Ilow AI is Poweringa Revolution in Medical Diagnostics,THE ENGINEER (Feb.
12, 2o19, 1:o8 PM), https://www.theengineer.co.uk/ai-medical-diagnostics [https://perna.cc/
UZ8U-WFH 5 ].
7. Peter Leonard, Beyond Data Privacy: Data "Ownership" and Regulation of Data-Driven
Business, SCITuCiI LAwYER (Jan. 17, 2o2o), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/sciencetechn
ology/publications/scitechjlawyer/ 2020/winter/beyond-data-privacy-data-ownership-and-regul
ation-datadriven-business [https://perma.cc/SM2-J2YCI.
8.
Ben Datner, Tomas Chanorro-Premuzic, Richard Buchband & Lucinda Schettler, The
Legal and Ethical Implications of Using.A in Iiring, HARV. BuS. REv. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://hbr.or
g/2019/o 4 /the-legal-and-ethical-implications-of-using-ai-in-hiring
[https://perma.cc/NTB2-N

A 7 N].
9. Vyacheslav Polonski, AI Is Convicting Criminalsand DeterminingJail Time, but is it Fair?,
WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11 /algorithms-cour
t-criminals-jail-time-fair [https://perma.cc/LC 5 P-DFG4].
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entitlement amounts using an AI tool." Any decisions previously made by
humans could conceivably be automated by AI in the future." For this reason,
regulating the technology and promoting innovation without context or
corresponding potentialities is nearly impossible. 2 Two key issues seem to
permeate healthcare Al and a variety of other AI-use cases: first, whether Al is
reliable, safe, and fair; and second, how the Al algorithm rendered a
decision.13 For example, the U.S. public may wish to ensure AI products on
the market will not malfunction or render discriminatory results. In court
cases, it may be desirable to understand how a decision was reached, for
example when establishing proximate cause for a negligence claim.
Furthermore, data used to create AI could be beneficial for other uses that
promote innovation.
One key impediment to addressing these issues is opacity, or the lack of
transparency in A decisions. Although advocates of A transparency
frequently demand the AI algorithm be explained, various A choices affect
whether the A is reliable, safe, and fair, such as technology infrastructure, A
design approach and goals, process and training choices, testing, and data
selection and structure reflect human choices that are intentionally not
disclosed to the public.u
As explained by Frank Pasquale, opaque algorithms are both
incomprehensible, not able to be explained, and secret.15 According to Frank
Pasquale's foundational text, The Black Box Society, secrecy includes both real
secrecy (or functional technical secrecy) and legal secrecy, created through
obligation, such as contract.' 6
Legal secrecy may include various legal mechanisms that cause
information to not be disclosed to the public, such as privacy law, private law
confidentiality provisions and contractual data use restrictions, and trade
secrecy. Each of these legal vehicles promote opacity to various degrees, but

t0.
DAVID FREEMAN ENGSIROM, DANIEI E. HO, CAI IERINE M. SI IARKEY& MARIANO-FI ORENTINO
CUIAR, GOVERNMENT BY ALGORFI IM: ARTIFICIAL INTEILLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISIRATIVE
AGENCIES 37-38 (2020), https://www-cdn.Iaw.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/AC
US-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8W 3 -V 5 Z 5 ].
11.
Thomas C. Linn, Anyihing You Can Do, A.1. Can Do Be/er? BAI lIMORE SUN (Nov. 24,
2017, 6:oo AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-11 26-artificial-intelli
gence-2017112o-story.html [https://perma.cc/S8AG-HVYR].
12. Indeed, just as context is important for building reliable, safe, and fair AI, context is also
important for determining the appropriate legal model to balance innovation with individual
interests.

13.
14.

Charlotte A. Tschider, Beyond the "Black Box", 98 DENV. L. REV. 683, 685-88 (2021).
Id. at 690-91, 693; W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419,

433 (2015).
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
15.
MONEYAND INFORMATION 6-7 (2015). Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale similarly note

that opacity also prevents review by "regulators charged with protecting" those affected by
automated processing. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
far Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2014).
t6. See PASQUALE, supra note 15, at 6.

IOWA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

13o

[Vol.

1 o6:1 26

collectively illustrate how purely voluntary legal choices lead to opacity issues.

The way in which vehicles of legal secrecy promote AI opacity will be described
as a new term, legal opacity.
This Response makes two novel contributions to the legal literature on
algorithmic opacity. First, this Response explores an undertheorized aspect of
opacity, legal opacity, wherein legal mechanisms are used to prevent disclosure
about an Al system. Second, this Response proposes strategies to satisfy the
twin goals of data necessity through disclosure and justifiable non-disclosure,
or data essentialism.'7 I aim to more fully illustrate the cards stacked against
advocates for openness, transparency, and innovation while also exploring
potential solutions that balance interests to prevent disclosure and interests
to disclose.
In 2021, the Iowa Law Review published an insightful piece by Nicholson
Price and Arti Rai, Clearing Opacity Through Machine Learning.S The essay
explored the problem of algorithmic opacity, in particular algorithmic opacity
for artificial intelligence, proposing the contours of a solution that could solve
two key goals: 1) overcoming opacity-the inability to know how an
algorithmic decision is made-to solve any number of legal challenges arising
from the black-box nature of some artificial intelligence applications;' and
2) encouraging A openness to spur innovation in access to data and
explanation that could transform the next wave of scientific development.In it, Price and Rai adopted an approach inspired by innovation scholarship
that is applied to health care technology.
In response to Price and Rai's excellent work, I aim to explore the legal
hurdles that must be cleared in order to legally and more fully "clear
opacity."22 Specifically, I examine legal barriers in the context of data
essentialism: that high-volume, representative, and organized big data sets are
central to AI innovation and ongoing development.
Part II describes opacity's problem as explained by Price and Rai,
including expansion of the term to include other private legal doctrine, such
as contractual data ownership and confidentiality. Part III turns to probable
scenarios, broadly construed, where disclosure may be desirable or necessary.
Part III examines organizational restrictions on contractual data ownership,
confidentiality, and trade secrecy with exploration into competing goals of
privacy law and Al. Part IV introduces potential solutions, specifically
contextual and nuanced legal strategies, to navigate the need for technology

17.
Wendy Netter Epstein & Charlotte Tschider, We Need to Do More with Jfospitals'Data,but
There Are Belier Ways, HARV. L. PiIRIE-FI.OM CIR.: BilL OF HEAI:I I (Jul. 7, 2021), https://blog.pet

rieflom.law.harvard.edu/2o02/07/o7/hospital-data-big-tech [https://perma.cc/ 5 K6E-8H3L].
18.
W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, ClearingOpacity Through Machine Learning 'o6 IOWA
L. Rv. 775 (2021).
See id. at 779.

Id. at 779, 781.

21.
22.

Jd. at 781-8 4

.

19.

20.

See id. at 778-80.
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and data disclosure in various respects, intended to spur a fuller discussion.
Solutions should balance individual privacy interests, contractual data rights,
and trade secrecy with data essentialism while acknowledging the strong
federal and state support of maintaining trade secrecy and private contracting
for confidentiality and data control.
II. OPACITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF ESTABLISHED LEGAL DOCTRINE
Although opacity is typically expressed as opacity of processes and data,
legal opacity introduces additional challenges to AI disclosure and
transparency goals. Understanding not only the nature of opacity but also the
goals of transparency are essential to determining the appropriate framework
for enhancing innovation while protecting individual interests, such as
privacy, fairness, and safety.
A. UNDERSTANDING

OPACITYAS ONE EXAMPLE

OFREDUCEDACCESS

Although opacity may prevent useful disclosure or hamper innovation, it
is important to point out that opacity, in its broad sense, is a longstanding
problem. Opacity is not that different from the legal concept of confidentiality,
where access to relevant and sometimes important information is purposely
not available to certain untrusted parties, established through private contract
or internal policy.,. Confidentiality, as it is operationalized in private
contracting, has important functions too. Banking system technology may
contain data that are not personal information yet maintaining confidentiality
may nevertheless prevent a cyberattack that could compromise customer
accounts.24
Confidentiality can also reduce the likelihood of personal information
misuse, such as preventing important details about a patient's medical
condition from being shared with the broader community. Overall,
confidentiality is the mechanism of keeping information private, whatever its
status-personal information, proprietary information, or trade secret.: For
this reason, confidentiality overlaps with information privacy and trade
secrecy, though confidentiality obligations are largely communicated in
contract. 2
Organizations often choose trade secrecy as a method to protect
organizational investment in Al, which may be a weak or strong form of

23.
See generally Charles Tait Graves & Sonia K. Katyal, From Trade Secrecy to Seclusion, 109
GuO. L.J. 1337 (2021) (discussing how confidentiality is established in the context of trade
secrets).
24. Information Security Confidentiality, GEEKSFORGEEKS (May 9, 2019), https://www.geeksfo
rgeeks.org/information-security-confidentiality [https://perna.cc/YgRL-Z6TR].
25.
26.

Id.
CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER, INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECITRITYAND PRIVACYLAW IN PRACTICE

186-87, 378 (2018).

1.32
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protection depending on what and against whom protection is desired.7 The
foundation for trade secrecy is unfair competition, 3 wherein an individual
who uses improper means to take and use the trade secret can be held
accountable under trade secret misappropriation.29 If an organization takes
reasonable steps to keep a trade secret, well, secret, and a person (or a
downstream organization receiving the secret) takes and uses the information
through improper access, the trade secret owner can recover under state or
federal law.3' AI is a natural fit for trade secret protection due to the
unavailability of alternatives like patent law and the natural opacity of its
processes and algorithms..'
Confidentiality obligations are usually enforced via common law contract
actions in state and federal court using state choice of law,,2 while trade
secrecy is enforced through federal and state statutes.33 If an individual or
another organization, such as a third party, exceeds their contractuallyspecific data uses, the individual or organization may face breach of contract
allegations or trade secrecy legal issues.34 For example, a contract may specify
that a third party is responsible for maintaining an investment system that
contains stock purchases and sales of shareholders. However, this does not
necessarily (and often does not) permit the third party to access or use the
data in these systems for their own purposes. Doing so would exceed their
contractual authority.35

27.
See Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 791, 793. Trade secrecy can be construed as "low cost,"
though meeting requirements to invest reasonable means for keeping such information secret
certainly can be expensive. Foundationally, some information may not be able to be maintained
as secret due to its broad use, relying instead on broad personnel confidentiality provisions and
internal policy. Trade secrets still require additional investment and reasonable notice to be
legally defensible trade secrets. See Tom Kulik, NDAs & How to Lose Your Trade Secrets Without Really
Tying ABOVE THE LAw (Dec. 11, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2ol8/12/n
das-how-to-lose-your-trade-secrets-without-really-trying [https://perma.cc/EA3G-TABT].

28.

See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When
Follow the Uniform TradeSecrets Act, 33 HAM LINE L. REV. 493, 495 (20 10)
29.
See id. at 5 29.
30.
See Michael J. Kasdan, Kevin M. Smith & Benjamin Daniels, Trade Secrets: What You Need
to Know, TilE NA'L L. REV. (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trade-secrets
-what-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/29UR-2KWE].
31.
See Tschider, supranote 13, at 700, 711-13.
32.
See Jordan Porter, Determining Choice of Law in Civil Litigation, JD PORTER LLC LEGAI
PRACTICE (2o16), https://www.jdporterlaw.com/285-2/determining-choice-law-civil-litigation
[h

t'hey Do Not

ttps://perma.cc/U84J-GSWS].
See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a FederalJurisprudenceof Trade
33.
Secret Law, 3 2 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 840-43 (2017).
34.
See Deepa Varadarajan, The "TradeSecret-ContractInterface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 156o61 (2018); Douglas R. Nemec, Trade Secrets Take Center Stage, and Contracts Play a Lead Role,
SKADDEN'S 2019 INSIGHTS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/

oI/201g-insights/trade-secrets-take-center-stage

[https://perma.cc/ 5 9 5 L-Q9 5 G].
See Varadarajan, supra note 34, at 1560-62 (observing that although the existence of
35.
confidentiality provisions for individuals is persuasive, it is not necessarily dispositive for notice
of trade secrecy). Confidentiality provisions establish one requirement related to protection of
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As Price and Rai suggest, it is important to acknowledge that broader
issues of opacity, such as access to data or non-intuitive results for research
innovation, is not necessarily only a matter of opacity.3 6 Legal secrecy,
although usually referencing trade secrecy status37 also concerns thornier
issues of contractual data ownership rights, confidentiality obligations, and a
strong U.S. predisposition to protect trade secrets, all of which reinforce the
desire of organizations to control their investments and occupy the market.38
These forms of legal secrecy, though increasing opacity, also protect
substantial investments in the creation, acquisition, collation, organization,
and combination of the massive data sets necessary to run the reliable, fair,
efficacious, safe, and efficient Al systems.39 Problems emerge when legal
secrecy's benefits to an organization outweigh the interests of the public.40
B. SYSTEM AND TOOL OiACITY V. EIECuTuIE (LEGA L) O,'Ci'Y
Opacity is, as Price and Rai contend, a matter of technological choices,
or system and tool opacity, and opacity by choice, or deliberate secrecy, which
often overlap.41 Tool opacity, for example, is a combination of algorithmic
complexity and non-intuitiveness, where both the inputs into a decisional
system and the decisional outcomes and logic behind such outcomes are not
readily understandable by experts.42 As I have described along the same lines,
complexity includes not only inscrutability, or algorithmic complexity and
non-intuitiveness, but also dynamism, or the self-learning capability of some AI
machine learning utilities, or unlocked unsupervised learning.43 Tool opacity
can also include deliberate secrecy efforts, such as keeping technical details
of algorithmic development secret.e

information generally and notice of legitimate data uses. Trade secrecy generally requires more
and different notice, though information or data that is a trade secret is a subset of generally
confidential data. Thadford Felton, The Differences Between 'Confidential' and 'Trade Secret'
Information, and Why They Matter, GREENSFELDER: IMPACT I BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT BLOG
(Feb. 1, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://www.greensfelder.com/business-risk-management-blog/thedifferences-between-confidential-and-trade-secret-information-and-why-they-matter [https://per

ma.cc/N48T-PBQA].
36.

Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 793-94

37.

See PASQUALE, supra note 15, at 6.
See JOh N R. Th OMAS, CONG. RSCi I. SERV., Ti IL ROIL OF TRADE SECREIS IN INNOVATION
(Jan. 15, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R 41391.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JFK

38.

PO ICY 1

-TXT 9 ].
39.
See John Bantlerman, The Big Cost ofBzgDala, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:21 AM), https://w
ww.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2o 12/I4/16/the-big-cost-of-big-data/?sh= 7 6 5 dafo6 5 a3b [http
s://perma.cc/8JAS-UZQD].
SeeW. Nicholson Price II, RegulaIing Serrecy, 91 WASIh. L. RnV. 1769, 1784 (2016).
40.
41.
See Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 784.
42.
Id.
43.
44.

See Tschider, supra note 13, at 689-99.
See Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 784.
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Tool opacity, however, is not system opacity. System opacity refers to
underlying real-world systems in which AI performs.45 For example, a system
may be the biological mechanisms that cause a specific type of brain cancer
or the pharmacological approach to treating this type of cancer.4 The
method for explaining these systems will likely involve scientific investigation
to determine cancer markers-including genetic screening, data analysis,
pharmacokinetic testing, and a series of clinical testing phases-though an
excellent cancer diagnostician identifies a probability of cancer without being
able to explain exactly how the diagnosis was made.47
In contrast, tool opacity likely means that the AI used to diagnose this
type of brain cancer may determine a patient has brain cancer with 92 percent
certainty, but depending on the machine learning model used, AI architects
or the oncologists using this technology may not understand how the
diagnosis is rendered.4
Further, the methods, training data, and
infrastructure of the system may be protected using legal secrecy strategies by
the organization creating the tool.
This distinction is incredibly useful in determining whether and to what
extent mandating transparency will meaningfully add value or not. As Price
and Rai rightly mention, some of the same aspects that increase tool opacity,
such as non-intuitiveness, have important roles in reducing system opacity.9
Non-intuitiveness is a condition that occurs when the results do not make
sense.53
For example, an AI system may successfully predict breast cancer from
mammogram images 95 percent of the time but when probed further, the
reason for the 95 percent success rate may be because the AI utilities
correlated a light spot on some images artificially and improperly introduced
by the digital machine. In this case, the field recording probable thickening
of tissue might actually have nothing to do with legitimate field imaging
details at all. The non-intuitiveness aspect could force AI developers to tune
and correct an Al system to improve its efficacy but may also provide
important information to researchers studying breast cancer, such as what
qualities the artificial spot might have accompanied in the principal image.
C. WIIENAIEXPANA TION iS NECESSARY OR HIGIIY USEFL.
In my article, Beyond the Black Box, I challenged whether mandated
explanation is the most effective way to think about broadly preventing issues

45.
46.

Id. at 779-94.
See Price, supranote 14, at 433-34-

47.

Id.

See Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the [Jean ofA l, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 1, 2017), https://
[https://per
www.technologyreview.com/2017/04/11/511 3 /the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai

48.

rna.cc/

5

FNL-ZNAA].

49.

See Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 794-95-

50.

Id. at 784.
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related to Al opacity and legal secrecy.5' In it, I suggested that disclosure of
information other than an explanation of the decision would likely provide
more useful information than broad algorithmic explanation to improve AI
safety and reduce the potential for discrimination and unfairness.32 This
additional information includes: whether the Al will be technically supervised
or unsupervised, whether deep learning will be used, and if the algorithm(s)
will be locked in final release form; details about data volume, structure,
diversity, representation; the type of Al and the process for creating it,
including overall structure and decisional layers; testing procedure and plans
for ongoing tuning and improvement; and the technical infrastructure.53
However, the disclosive value of these AI system inputs does not mean
explanation will never be useful or that it is not worth exploring how
explanation could be achieved.54 Achieving goals of fairness and safety may
require a different model of disclosure other than fulfilling, for example,
innovation goals. It is crucial to understand what the goals are before
designing a legal model for achieving them.
There is a myriad of situations where some degree of disclosure in
automated decision-making will be necessary to protect individuals or
promote social benefit. It is crucial, however, to understand the variety of
situations where explanation is desirable, important, or essential. Why?
Because mandating, compelling, or incentivizing explanation will likely
destroy trade secrecy status, compromise confidentiality, or impact data
ownership interests in private contracts.
Therefore, when considering when and under what conditions Al
transparency is desirable, it must be weighed against the value of trade
secrecy, confidentiality, and private contracting in innovation and investmentgenerating legal tools.55 It must also be balanced with privacy interests of
individuals who might be identifiable in data disclosure or algorithmic
explanation.5 6 Under some circumstances, the strong public interest will
understandably weigh against preserving legal opacity. For others, the public
interest may not be as compelling. If the United States intends to invalidate
forms of legal protection without a useful alternative, we should clearly
understand the various markets and sectors affected, including how disclosure
will affect innovation behavior and other public interests.

51.

See Tschider, supranote 13, at 688.

52.
The concern in mandating outright algorithmic disclosure, broadly, is that
organizations might provide such an explanation, and that that explanation may not be
particularly useful in meeting the goal of less discriminatory, safer AI technologies. Id. at 700.

53

Id. at 693-97.

54.

Id. at 723-24

55.

Id. at 715-19.

56.

See Price & Rai, supr note 18, at 79o, 81o.
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AI Non-Intuitiveness Valuable for Scientific Development and Product
Efficacy

As Price and Rai describe in great detail, non-intuitiveness can prompt
explanations that are very important for understanding the broader system in
which an Al functions, especially to field experts.7 When an AI's decision or
resulting function is non-intuitive, such explanation may be critically
important, which could demonstrate some underlying issue in the technology
or process, especially when scientific research must be reproduced.5½ It could
also reveal some new discovery related to the system being studied, such as a
new understanding for when insulin is most effectively delivered or how to
most effectively protect pedestrians near a self-driving car. Price and Rai
specifically describe the value of data sharing and explanation for scientific
development in the health sector, where large scale, useful data may be
difficult to aggregate and collect.59 Without access to big data sets, important
health advancements might never be achieved.>°
2. Al Transparency for Preventing Injury and Demonstrating Proximate
Cause
AI transparency may be necessary when the decision or resulting function
may cause or may have caused injury to people or damage to property. If exante regulatory oversight bodies (or delegated third parties) review AI systems
for safety, organizations using Al may need to provide sample explanations or
other information about the AI to illustrate a low risk of foreseeable injuries
prior to clearance, which may be needed "to observe the regulated
behavior."6 ' Indeed, more active clearance processes, like those operated by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), could specifically require
certain disclosures, such as training data, prior to receiving drug or medical
device clearance.2
For example, a countertop AI-enabled slow-cooker could foreseeably
exceed its heat setting and increase risk of fire in a consumer's home.
Disclosures of representative explanations along with process and technology
details could be useful to demonstrate that the manufacturer has reasonably

57.
58.

Id. at 794-97.
Id. at 797.

59. Id. at 798-99. Reproducibility is a significant problem in scientific research, and small,
non-representative data sets worsen these issues. Unfortunately, patent law, as it stands, does not
provide the type of disclosure needed to satisfy this goal.
60. IleaithcareBig Data and the Promise of Value-Based Care, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Jan.
1, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10. io 5 6/CAT. 18.0290 [https://perna.cc/6ABLS 9 TY].
61.

Price, supra note 40, at 1785.
62.
Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 804. More comprehensive review processes and upfront
disclosures might prevent downstream torts, especially for sectors like health where regulators
have an opportunity to prevent later safety issues. Charlotte A. Tschider, Medical Device Artificial
Iflelligenre: The New Tart rontier, 46 BYU L. Rv. 1551, 1568-73 (2021).
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implemented appropriate technical steps to avoid injury.63 Of course, ex ante
regulatory disclosure of representative explanations does not necessarily
mean Al will never actually cause downstream injury.4
Actual, historical explanation may be necessary when individuals have
suffered bodily injury or when property damage has occurred. Regulatory
oversight bodies may require organizations using Al to report injuries or
property damage, which could encourage AI accountability.> For commonlaw tort actions, explanations may be essential to demonstrate factual
causation and for useful inputs to proximate cause analyses. 66 Indeed, under
many circumstances an explanation of how the AI made a decision may be
necessary tojustify or defend an undesirable outcome.>
3. Al Explanation to Resolve Contractual Disputes
Furthermore, explanation may be necessary when injury occurs between
sophisticated legal entities. Some organizations will not create AI solutions on
their own, relying instead on AI solution providers. 8 In contracts between
organizations and technology solution providers, often provisions are added
which designate non-performance or culpability when the technology does
not work as intended. 6 9 When organizations rely on an Al solution provider,
it is foreseeable (as with any other IT solution or contracting activity) that
unanticipated results may occur while using an Al solution. For example, an
organization manufacturing engines may use AI for supply chain
management or to assemble the engine in a facility.
If the AI does not perform as anticipated, such as introducing a defect
into the manufacturing process or routing raw materials to the wrong facility,
63.
64.

Tschider, supra note 13, at 706-07.
See Tschider, supra note 62, at 1568-72, 1603-04-

Id. at 1604. Although post-market surveillance activities are common for the FDA and
65.
limited other agencies, they do not eliminate the need for tort recovery. However, they may
improve Al products and the processes for validating their safety and efficacy.
66.
See Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and Al's Human Users, i oo B.U. L. REV. 13 15, 1344-46
(2o2o) (analyzing foreseeability in establishing proximate cause for Al injuries).
67.
Margot E. Kaminski, Understanding Transparency in Algorithmic Accouniability, in TiHI
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 1 21, 123 (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2021).
Kaminski describes this as the need for "justification." Jd.
68.
See Fernando Lucini, What's the Best Al Strategy: Build, Buy, Partner?, AccIKNTURE (May 6,
2019), https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/digital/best-ai-strategy-build-buy-partner [ht
tps://perma.cc/ 4 BKR-KMK9]; Should You Build orBuy Your Al?, FORBES (May 22, 2019, 2:55 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/05/22/should-you-build-or-buy-your-ai/?s
h=icfbc 5 fa4 4 1d [https://perma.cc/VG 3 Z-LgFZ]; Maria Korolov, A! Technology: When to Build,
When to Buy, CIO (Apr. g, 2019, 3:oo AM), https://www.cio.com/article/3387618/ai-technology

/

-when-to-build-when-to-buy.html [https://perma.cc/SQPT-FGSBJ.
69.
See, e.g., Anna Chen, Nicole Heller & Rebecca Lindhout, Termination Rights in IT Services
Contracts- Making Sure You Can Get Out When It All Goes Wrong, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 17, 20 13), https: /
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3a14e5 4 b-cfl 4 -4 38a-86d 4 -ocfd 5 io3abo2 [https://per
ma.cc/NKT2-Q2BM]; Jim Steinberg & Meredith Francis, Terminating Long-Term Technology
Agreements, FUILTON CNTY. DAILY RPT. (May 1, 2015), https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/me
dia/Files/articles/2o15/TechArticle511 5 .ashx [https://perma.cc/SYC2-9 5 CW].
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the organization will likely seek redress.7' If the AI solution creator resists
correcting the problem or absorbing financial cost, the organization may sue
the Al solution provider if such problems sufficiently demonstrate a material
breach as defined in the contract or may pursue termination based on
activities defined in the termination clause.v In order to resolve whether the
AI solution provider caused the injury or breached the contract, the
organization may seek Al explanation to determine whether the solution
provider is responsible rather than the organization.
4. AI Disclosure to Prevent or Address Discrimination
AI may directly discriminate against certain groups due to discriminatory
data used to create the algorithms, based on proxies for such data, or because
the algorithm has not been properly tested to avoid these outcomes.7 2 To
prevent discrimination or to address due process concerns, explanation may
be desirable and necessary in similar ways to tort actions. A future regulatory
agency could ensure AI algorithms are not: 1) designed to discriminate against
individuals in protected classes; or 2) designed in a way that nevertheless
disproportionately discriminates against these individuals.73 Regulating
algorithms could reduce the effects of discriminatory algorithms.74 Future
laws that require fairness in algorithmic Al functionality could require some
submission of AI prior to release and review by an agency or third parties.75
For example, an AI algorithm used for criminal sentencing may need to be
reviewed prior to its use due to the potential risk of disproportionately
impacting individuals in a way that directly affects their life and liberty.7 6

70.
Similar issues arise in language specific to cybersecurity breaches. When a data breach
occurs, often organizations both seek to determine what the root cause of such a breach might
be and have the opportunity to terminate the agreement. See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at 38o.
71.
See Leslie Marell, Defining "MaterialBreach" in Your Contract, MARELI, LAw FIRM (Mar. 2,
2015), http://marell-awfirm.com/defining-material-breach-contract [https://perma.cc/gUTM

-XKgU].
72.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra. note 15, at 3-4; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 694-702 (2016); Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel
Schwarcz, Proxy Discriminationin the Age of A rtilicialIntelligenceand Big Data, 1 05 IOWA L. REV. 1 257,
1273-81 (2o0o); Charlotte A. Tschider, Retylating the Internet of Things: Discriminalion, Privacy,
and Cyberseourity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENY. L. REV. 87, 97-103 (2018); Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in Jfealth Care, 19 YALE J.
HEAI:III POl'Y, L., & ETIIcs 1, 17-18 (2020).
See generally David S. Rubenstein, Acquiring Ethical A, 73 FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming
73.
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=37311o6 [https://perma.cc/87W
Q-HJBB] (describing U.S. interest in trustworthy, transparency At for government At use and
proposing regulatory involvement in procurement processes for acquiring Al).
74.
See Kaminski, supra note 67, at 122-23. Kaminski describes regulating this as
instrumental rationale. Id.

75.

See Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box
MICi1. TELLCOMM. & TEC1. L. REv. 1, 18-ig (2016).

Medici n, 23

76.
See generally Cary Coglianese & Lavi M. Ben Dor, Al in Adjudication and Administration,
86 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=
3501067 [https://perma.cc/Q6T-ZVE 4 ] (describing guidelines developed by the Administrative
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whether

intentional or not, may seek to introduce an explanation of the algorithm's
decision or function to prove that the algorithm discriminated on the basis of
protected class.77 Government agencies making decisions regarding
entitlements, such as eligibility and amount of a welfare payment, may use
AI.78 Or a credit check tool used to determine whether an individual qualifies
for housing may be "appealable" if the tool is later demonstrated to be
discriminatory.7! Algorithms may be used in any number of decisions that
dramatically affect an individual's economic prospects, legal rights, or
government entitlements,', and it is crucial to clearly delineate the policy
goals prior to determining an appropriate legal approach.
III. LEGAL OPACITY & DATA ESSENTIALISM

AI technology may be key to resolving legal issues, but legal strategies may
also function to make these same technologies opaque. Legal opacity is
created both through private contract terms and statutory privacy
requirements, which collectively create substantial impediments to
transparency goals.
AI transparency may be valuable in many different legal and non-legal
scenarios, and, as Price and Rai suggest, machine learning may be the
Conference of the United States for considering issues like transparency, bias, technical capacity,
and procurement and types of AI introduced to date); c. Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Competing
Aggorithms for Law: Sentencing, Admissions, and Employment, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 390-92 (2021)
(proposing competing algorithms rather than calls for algorithmic transparency).

&

See Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While Preventing
77.
Iiscrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REv. 1413, 1417-19 (2014)
(acknowledging the integrated nature of protected classes within scoring and decision-making
systems); Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparencyto Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TFEiKCOMM. & HIGI
TECii. L. 235, 236-40, 244-50 (2011) (examining the interplay of secrecy and explanation to
determine where transparency in explanation is warranted). See generally Lilian Edwards
Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a "Right to an Explanation" to a "Right to Better
Decisions"?, 16 IEEE SuC. & PRIV. 46 (2018) (arguing that putting the onus on individuals to
challenge opaque systems may not be the best model for improving AI).
78.
ENGSFROM ET Al,., supra note to, at 1o, 37-44.
See Charlton McIlwain, Al ias Exacerhated Racial Bias in iousing. Could It Jhelp Eliminate
79.
It Ins/ead? MIT TuCi1. REv. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2o2o/to/2o/
1009452/ai-has-exacerbated-racial-bias-in-housing-could-it-help-eliminate-it-instead
[https://pe
rma.cc/AU 4 W-X9XB]; Patrick Sisson, [Jousing Discrimination Goes Jligh Tech, CURBED (Dec. 17,
2019, 6:12 PM), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/12/17/21026311/mortgage-apartment-ho
using-algorithm-discrimination [https://perma.cc/3YPU-NV 4 Y]; William Gordon, Katherine
Kirkpatrick & Katherine Martin, Artificial Jntelligence and the Fair [Jousing Act: Algorithms Under
Attack?, JD SITPRA (June 20, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/artificial-intelligence-an

d-the-fair-1o1 5 3 [https://perma.cc/JZU 4 -TDYL].
8o.
This is precisely why the state of Colorado and the European Union ("EU") have
statutorily protected an individual's ability to avoid profiling and automated processing when
such processing is likely to affect an individual's legal interests or similar rights. SeeS. 21-190, 7 3 d
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/ 4 6/EC

(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016

O.J.

(L 119) 1, art. 22.
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are

complex.81 But requiring or compelling "explanation" or promoting AI
transparency is not as simple as just mandating it-an explanation without
context is likely not very useful. 82 How an Al algorithm works, including the
system, process, testing, and infrastructure used to create it, may be useful to
know, but it is often protected from disclosure under confidentiality
language, non-disclosure agreements, and other contractual methods.83
Confidentiality obligations, data ownership contractual provisions, and trade
secrecy status reflect an organization's need to protect its investments in
cutting-edge research, usually resulting in less data use and sharing.i4
Data protection and privacy laws also restrict data collection, use, and
retention.8: Laws in most jurisdictions include data minimization principles
along with data use limited to what is explicitly disclosed in a privacy notice to
the downstream individual about whom data are collected.8 6 Overall, the legal
impediments to explanation and broad data sharing are more nebulous and
intransigent that one might immediately expect when focused on the
language of secrecy.
A. DISCRETIONARY LEGAL CIIOICES

When any organization has developed or acquired an invention, one
initial step involves consultation with attorneys and discussion of the
appropriate strategic approach to protect financial interests tied to such an
invention.8 7 This brief Response cannot fully describe the many ways in which
organizations and individuals hope to profit from their investments and

81.

See Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 785. Although explanations are usually statistical

approximations, machine
extent.

learning

can be used to explain machine

learning

systems to some

82.
Id. at 785-86; seeTschider, supranote i3, at 692-96 (describing the details of AI systems
that could better fulfill fairness and safety goals).
See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
83.
84.
Indeed, this is precisely why data sharing agreements have become a common
contractual form when data is involved. If data will be shared, specific limitations may govern
such transactions. See Julien Debussche, Jasmien Cesar, Benoit Van Asbroeck & Isis De Moortel,
BigData & Issues & Opportunities: DataSharingAgreements, BIRD & BIRD (Apr. 2019), https://www.t
wobirds.com/en/news/articles/201 g/global/big-data-and-issues-and-data-sharing-agreements [h
ttps://perma.cc/EU 5 8-JZET]. Such agreements usually include not only use and restrictions
from a contractual perspective, but applicable law related to data protection and privacy. See
Nemac, suna note 34. Confidentiality and trade secrecy language are usually integrated into
contracts between organizations and between an organization and its personnel (including
contractors and employees).
85.
See Tschider, supra note 72, at 110-12.
86.

Id.

Wil Michiels, How Do You ProlecI Your Machine Learninglnvestment?, EE TIMES (Mar. 26,
https://www.eetimes.com/how-do-you-protect-your-machine-learning-investment
[htt
ps://perma.cc/F 5 D 4 -UMDN1; Andrea WeissJeffries & EmilyJ. Tait, ProtectingArtificial Jntelligence
JP: Patents, Trade Secrets, orCopyights?, JONES DAY (Jan. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insi
ghts/2oi8/oi/protecting-artificial-intelligence-ip-patents-trad [https://perma.cc/C 7 A9-3NAC].
87.
2020),
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inventions, but suffice to say, these individuals do not necessarily struggle with
whether to protect it but rather with how. 88

There are a variety of legal tools organizations and individuals use to
protect their inventions including trade secrecy, patents, and private
contracts. These legal tools limit disclosure of information, as does privacy
law. Trade secrecy, private contracting, and privacy law, used together,
present a cumulative effect that enhances opacity, rather than promoting
transparency of Al technologies and underlying data.
1.

Trade Secrecy & Patent Law

First, it is important to distinguish between secrecy and trade secrecy.
Secrecy is the act of something being a secret or secretive whereas trade
secrecy only exists because the law protects secrets that meet specific
requirements. Some Al technologies, for example, may be dynamically
inscrutable.89 Dynamically inscrutable algorithms dynamically change and
learn, updating the live algorithm as new data inform these changes.
Algorithms that are inscrutable are not able to be easily explained; even their
(human) data scientist creators may not understand how they render a
decision due to the complexity of the underlying system. This form of secrecy,
both in underlying complexity and in continuous change, does not
immediately qualify any Al technologies a trade secret. However, this kind of
"natural" secrecy may make these technologies good candidates.
Trade secrecy's combination of private law, federal law, and state law is a
potent and often attractive legal approach to protect inventions that may
make poor candidates for patenting and in situations where complementary
intellectual property techniques are desirable.90 Unlike patent law, where a
granted patent permits an organization to maintain a limited monopoly on
an invention protectible and disclosed under federal law, a trade secret exists
because an organization determines it exists and protects it as such.9' The lack
of a central regulatory body that requires submission of a trade secrets for
approval means that organizations may maintain any number of trade secrets
for an unrestricted period of time.
Trade secrecy requires that trade information is kept secret to receive the
defensive benefit of being able to sue an individual or organization for trade

88.

See Michiels, supra note 87.
See Tschider, supranote 13, at 68g-go.
go.
Steven R. Daniels & Sharae' L. Williams, So You Want to Take a Trade Secret to a Patent
ight ? Managing the Conflicts between Patents and Trade Secret Rights, LAN DSLI DE (Aug. 5, 201 9), https:
/ /www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual-property-law/ publications/landslide/ 2018-19/
july-august/so-you-want-take-trade-secret-patent-fight [https://perma.cc/Z876-C7QH]; Karl F.
Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Syneggy, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1-2
(2008).
g1.
Lawrence Goodwin & Stacy Grossman, Trade Secrets, N.Y.C. BAR (Dec. 2018), https://ww
w.nycbar.org/get-legal-help/article/intellectual-property/trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/U5V
C-QW2G].

89.
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secret misappropriation.92 This secrecy generally requires that only a few
individuals within an organization know of the trade secret and that the
invention cannot be reverse engineered, or that the trade secret cannot be
immediately discovered using reasonable means.3 Organizations have further
buttressed trade secrecy status through employee confidentiality contract
provisions and vendor contracts,94 which partially demonstrates notice to such
actors about their obligations with respect to confidential information and
trade secrets.95 Indeed, trade secrets can exist absent from reference in a
contract and are often positioned as an alternative to protection via contract,
but organizations usually pursue both simultaneously.s6
Trade secrecy can be applied to many aspects of an A invention, from
data to process, system architecture, to the algorithms themselves.97 And trade
secrecy will render a substantial amount of the invention secret: If
information is disclosed, even to a larger group of individuals, organizations
could risk destroying their trade secrets.08 Without trade secrecy status,
organizations-especially for-profit start-ups who have created new and
innovative Al products and systems-cannot otherwise enjoy legal protection
for their investment in the event patents are not available to them.9 This
operates as a Catch-22: By disclosing, organizations have no protection for
these inventions, yet by maintaining secrecy, transparency is not possible.'°'
Organizations may use a combination of approaches to protect their
investment and inventions. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, for its
part, has noted the "complementary" nature of trade secrecy to patents,
acknowledging the relative overlap and buttressing of inventions-patents

92.

See Daniels & Williams, supranote go.

93.
94.

Id.

98.

FENwICK & WEST LLP, TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION: A PRIMER AND DESK REFERENCE FOR

See Jorda, supra note go, at 7-8.
95.
A confidentiality agreement is not usually enough alone but can be part of a strategy for
notifying individuals as to the presence of a trade secret and their attendant obligations. See
Varadarajan, supra note 34, at 1560-62.
g6. Jeanne C. Fromer, Mac/ines as the New Qompa-Loompas: Tiade Secrecy, the Cloud, Mactine
Learning, and Automaion, g4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 706, 712.
97.
See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDoZo L.
REv. 1401, 1433 (2016); see Tschider, sura note 13, at 711-13.
MANAGERS AND IN HOUSE COUNSEL 2-3 (2001), https://assets.fenwick.com/legacy/FenwickDoc

uments/Trade_Secrets_Protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 5 ZNT-4 XY].
99. See David S. Levine & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Startups Use Trade Secrets? 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 751, 757-59 (2018). For some statistics on AI startups, see Sarah Feldman, Al Startup
FundingReachesReord High,SFAISIA (July31, 2019), https://www.statista.com/chart/18878/ar
tificial-intelligence-startup-funding [https://perma.cc/FEV 5 -CMUH].
loo.
Not everything can be rendered a trade secret; for example, information that must be
shared with a larger group of people or that can be reverse engineered from simply using
technology will generally not qualify. Nevertheless, for complex AI, as in neural networking, most
of the invention can reasonably be maintained as a trade secret. See Tschider, supra 13, at 712-

13.
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and trade secrets are not mutually exclusive.-, As Sonia Katyal has identified
in relation to computer source code, patent and trade secrecy are used as
complements, alternatives to one another, and sometimes in concert to
overprotect inventions., Scholars such as Nicholson Price and Christopher
Seaman have noted the problematic nature of similar subject matter for

patents and trade secrets, especially when trade secrecy is used to artificially
extend protection or when complementary patent and trade secret usage
overprotects technologies.'13
For AI technologies, however, patent law may not be a possible alternative
to trade secrecy, leaving organizations with few options for protected
disclosure of the invention itself. 4 While innovation might benefit from
increased disclosure of some kind, the unavailability of an alternative
mechanism to trade secrecy is problematic because organizations will likely
opt for trade secrecy rather than leave inventions unprotected.0 In order to
maintain a trade secret, organizations will not be able to transparently provide
at least some information on the Al system, lest destroy its trade secret status.
2. Contracts
Although many scholars have focused on trade secrecy as the primary
concern regarding Al, private contracting poses significantly more risk to data
transparency and subsequent use. For example, in the healthcare sector
healthcare providers and insurers, the organizations often operating, using,
implanting, or prescribing Al, do not create Al inventions. Rather, these
parties contract with medical device manufacturers, such as university entities,
start-ups, or sophisticated manufacturers, that license or sell AI technologies.
There are typically three types of contract language, whether managed within
a singular contract or multiple agreements. See Figure i for an illustration of
these arrangements.
Figure 1: Contracts Limiting Data Use

101.

Trade Secret Policy, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 18, 2020, 8: 4 9 AM), https://www.

uspto.gov/ip-policy/trade-secret-policy [https://perma.cc/S8KA- 4 JB2].
102.
Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. i 183, 1 21 1-16
(2o1g); see also Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Arli/irialInlelligenreInvenlions & Palen Disclosure, 125 PA. Si.
L. RV. 147, 182 (2020).

103.
SeeW. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92 NOTRE
DAM L. RiV. 161, 1614, t636 (2017); Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade
Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. &TECH. 1, 11-12 (2012).
104.
See Tschider, sutra note 13, at 715-16; Brian Higgins, The Role of Explainable Arlificial
Inelligenre in Palen Law, 31 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J., Mar. 2019, at 3, 7; Ebrahim, supra note
102, at 151-56. See generally Ryan Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLAL. REV. 2 (2019) (arguing
that obviousness in Al would be a significant bar for patent eligibility).
105.
Indeed, the algorithmic portion of an At invention will not be typically protected
because it is likely an abstract, mathematical idea, and the complexity and inscrutability of
complex algorithms means that it is far easier to keep its internal logic secret, what I've describe
as a "natural" trade secret. See Tschider, supra note 13, at 688-89.
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When healthcare providers ("HCPs") desire to prescribe or use Al,
whether implantable medical devices, AI diagnostic tools, or integrated A
systems (such as AI-enabled robotics or surgical tools), HCPs rely on the
technologies of third parties, such as medical device manufacturers, Al startups, or university technology providers, which may also be considered startups. These are "third parties" with respect to the HCP because they provide
the Al technology but not the patients."io In order to use Al technologies,
HCPs execute contracts with these third parties to negotiate pricing,
licensing, and details of their relationship. Although these parties may appear
to have linear relationships as described in Figure 1, the reality is that they
may also have relationships with each other, such as when a manufacturer
invests in university research and development or acquires a start-up or
licenses their technology. The reality is that private agreements are plentiful
in these arrangements and likely have included different terms depending on
the parties contracting and their relative goals.
What many scholars advocating for AI transparency may not be
considering is that these private contracts serve to render a great deal about
an Al system confidential, including system technology details and data
collected and used within that system with respect to the two parties.
There are at least three types of provisions or contracts that may be
executed. Sometimes these provisions will be integrated into one primary
contract or executed separately.

1o6.
Many of these third parties also rely on third parties, such as cloud providers that
manage applications or storage technologies for these organizations. In clinical trials, sometimes
health care providers enter into different contractual relationships with these third parties, for
example agreeing to administer a clinical trial or to recruit potential clinical trial participants.
For purposes of this illustration, I will be focusing on contractual relationships formed when an
AI system is already being used and (where applicable) has passed the FDA review process.
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Prior to executing a final contract, these organizations will frequently

execute a mutually restrictive non-disclosure agreement ("NDA"). NDAs
restrict disclosure of information deemed confidential or proprietary to each
organization."7 An NDA works to ensure confidential information from both
parties is not disclosed during initial discussions, for example if a third party
wishes to share information about the technology, or if an HCP wishes to
describe or use some information about its internal practices or patients.-8

After it is determined that the organizations would like to work together, a
more comprehensive contract is executed to govern actual technology
acquisition and use.
The primary contract executed will usually be a Master Services
Agreement or a Master Supply Agreement. A Master Services Agreement is a
common contract form used for arrangements where organizations will not
have any ownership rights in the technology, for example if an HCP does not
wish to purchase a surgical robot but does wish to use it. A Master Supply
Agreement is used when an HCP is purchasing the technology. These
contracts usually include at least three key sections that limit what these
organizations may do with the information they receive.
i. Licensing Terms
First, when an HCP will not own the product, a third party may ensure
licensing terms are included in the agreement. Licensing terms restrict how
and to what extent an HCP may use the product. For example, AI software
may only be installed on three computers, or ten physicians have the ability
to use it. Importantly, many licensing sections also restrict what an HCP can
do with respect to the invention. Specifically, many Master Services
Agreements and Master Supply Agreements include a "no reverse
engineering" obligation. Because reverse engineering is one way to destroy
trade secrecy status (by removing the technology secrecy requirement), third
parties use this contractual provision to limit any power an HCP might have
to make that protection unavailable. Functionally, this means that the HCP
may not use its position with access to the technology to figure out how it
works in a way that would destroy trade secrecy status.
ii. Confidentiality Terms

Second, confidentiality provisions are usually included even if an NDA
has previously been executed. Although an NDA is designed to govern precontractual discussions about technology and HCP operations and use cases,
confidentiality language included in Master Services or Supply Agreements

The 5 No's of Confidentiality Agreements, EVERYNDA (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.everynd
107.
a.com/blog/5-no-confidentiality-agreements [https://perma.cc/Y 4 BA-94Q 7 ].
io8.
Josh Angert, 6 Besl Pracires for Using Nondisclosure Agriemenis Duning the Procurement
Process, VENDORCENTRIC (June 12, 2019), https://vendorcentric.com/single-post/6-best-practic
es-for-using-nondisclosure-agreements-during-the-procurement-process
[https://perma.cc/NN

L 4 -ATK5 ].
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directly restricts external sharing of any information deemed confidential in
the contract, which includes technology details, patient details, and any other
proprietary information about the organizations. The operative impact is that
neither of the organizations can disclose any data or information to any other
entity, except in responding to a legally enforceable order. Often these
contracts also restrict the speed at which either organization can even respond
to an order, so that the other organization has the opportunity to execute a
protective order. Protective orders operate to limit disclosure in a court of law
pursuant to a legal action of any kind (e.g., an administrative agency's
investigation or a class action lawsuit).
iii. Data Ownership and Sharing Restrictions
Third, and perhaps most importantly, most MSAs include patient data
ownership rights established by the HCP with respect to their patients.
Although data do not have independent status under the law as real property
or intellectual property, they may be subject to restrictions in their use or
disclosure via contract.-°) Whether because of perceived privacy issues or a
desire for control over the data for some other reason, these provisions have
the effect of limiting a third party's use of patient data for any purposes other
than simply providing a service. This includes use by the third party and
sharing with any other entities. Functionally, this means that third parties may
not contractually use patient data collected pursuant to providing a service or
product for purposes such as product improvement, to create new products,
or for independent research.
Because data have no independent legal status outside intellectual
property status, data are typically a creature of contracts when they are poor
candidates for intellectual property protection: organizational rights to data
are subject to the limits that the providing organization attaches to them in
contract.", For example, an HCP may contract with a medical device
manufacturer to purchase or lease a surgical robot. This surgical robot
collects and transmits data back to the manufacturer to improve the
effectiveness of the robot over time. Despite the manufacturer having custody
of the data, likely the healthcare provider has limited use of the data collected
from the provider's patients under the contract.
This means that the

109.

TERESA SCASSA, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, CIGI PAPERS

NO. 187, DATA OWNERSHIP 2 (2018), https://www.cigionline.org/documents/1491 /Paper%20
no.187_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/G36Q-XE6E].
11o.
Id. at 7 n. 4 4, 7-10 (describing the challenges of using copyright protection and database
rights under EU law). Indeed, the idea/expression dichotomy makes copyright a poor available
choice for At that are used for inventive purposes. See generally Adam Mossoff, A Brie Hismy of
Software Patents (and Why They re Valid), GEO. MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. X INNOVATION
POL'Y (Sept. 18, 2013), https://cip2.gmu.edu/2013/09/18/a-brief-history-of-software-patentsand-why-theyre-valid-2 [https://perma.cc/2XZN-NBMB].
111.
See TSCHIDER, supra note 26, at Soo-o1. Data owners and data custodians often have
different rights and responsibilities with respect to data. When these roles are separated between
business entities, often a contract is used to establish and limit these responsibilities and rights.
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medical device manufacturer may not use these data for their internal

purposes.
When third parties and HCPs agree that data sharing is desirable, so that
the third party can use data supplied by the HCP for other reasons or disclose
this data to other organizations, a separate contract is usually executed and
appended to the MSA."2 These data sharing agreements, although
functioning to permit data sharing beyond the limitations of the MSA, still
limit data use and sharing to what the HCP specifies. 1 They may also include
profit sharing and other terms of benefit to the HCP for providing use of data
supplied.
Frequently, data sharing agreements also include privacy obligations with
respect to patient data. Commonly, it is required that a privacy notice and an
associated lawful basis (such as consent) will be executed for additional
uses. 1 4 In some jurisdictions outside of the United States (and in the United
States for specific sectors), data sharing in this way increases privacy
obligations to an individual about whom personally identifiable data are
maintained."5 For example, a third party cannot be directly regulated under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA")
because the third party is legally organized or incorporated outside of the
United States. However, if an MSA or data sharing agreement requires
compliance with HIPAA, the third party must comply lest potentially be in
breach of that contract. The inclusion of references to privacy laws, as
described in Section IIC, in private contracting language has the effect of
exporting privacy laws to third parties that may not be otherwise regulated.
When aggregated across all HCPs and third parties, private contracting
extends and expands legal opacity substantially. Organizations may be
functionally limited from using or sharing patient data because the contract
outright prohibits it. Therefore, even when trade secrecy and patents do not
protect Al technology statutorily, often several private contracts exist that
restrict disclosure and aim to control the dissemination of proprietary
information or data.
Contracts are tremendously powerful. In summary, confidentiality
provisions generally restrict disclosure of information about the Al

112.
See, e.g., RI. DEP'T oF HLAI:TII & HUM. SERVS., SAMPL E DAtA-SIIARING AND USAGE
AGREEMENT, https://www.cdc.gov/cancer/ncccp/doc/sampledatasharingusageagreement.doc
[https://perma.cc/F2HZ-8Z 5 2] (specifying data uses permitted, obligations of confidentiality,
and data ownership terms).
113.
See, e.g., Data Use Agreement Guidance, UNC RSCH., https://research.unc.edu/wp-content
/uploads/sites/61 /2013/04/CCM3-o3936o.pdf#:~:text=Data%20Use%2oAgreements%20%2

8DUAs%29%2oare%2ocontractual%2odocuments%2oused,the%2oappropriate%2odelegated
%2osignature%2oauthority%2ofrom%2othe%2oChancellor [https://perma.cc/CF 4 E-J7UF].
114.
See TSCHIDER, supranote 26, at 14-17 (describing notice and consent obligations), 3637 (defining secondary use and specifying required steps to process data for secondary purposes
cross-jurisdictionally).
115.
Id. at 39 (describing the challenges associated with maintaining multiple roles with
respect to the data).
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technology. Licensing language similarly prevents disclosure or other actions
that could destroy trade secrecy status. Data ownership language restricts data
use beyond what is specified, and even if organizations agree to a data sharing
agreement, these agreements usually include statutory privacy limitations,
which make further data use and sharing tremendously complicated. Each of
these provisions significantly limits transparency goals with respect to the
technology and data. The effect is privately negotiated and cumulative legal
opacity as HCPs negotiate multiple contracts with many third parties and third
parties negotiate with several HCPs.
B. PRivACY LA w: LEGA.LY MANnA TED

OPACITY

As an extension of data transmission and restriction, privacy goals
similarly complicate the notion of broad inventive disclosure, especially data
disclosure and algorithmic explanation when such explanation has the ability
to identify a natural person. The challenges associated with these disclosures
result from the disclosures themselves and the ability of organizations to
collect the volume of data necessary to create AI systems in the first place.
Although data protection and privacy laws may protect personal information,
they also present significant, potentially intractable, impediments to
innovation, one of Price and Rai's primary motivations for disclosure." 6
1. The U.S. Sectoral Privacy System
The United States has implemented a sectoral privacy system, which
means that certain sectors may establish more stringent or more flexible legal
requirements for data. This fact is important because promoting AI
innovation broadly is more complicated in the United States than potentially
for other globaljurisdictions that have passed an omnibus data protection law
that applies to all sectors.
Although a great variety of sectoral and use-specific laws exist in the
United States, I will use HIPAA as an example of data use restrictions."7
HIPAA established a broad data minimization standard for protected health
data, insofar that data collected generally may not be collected unless such
collection is necessary for treatment, payment, or healthcare operations."
Unlike clinical trial data subject to the Common Rule, which usually permits

See Price & Rai, supra note 18, at 781.
117.
Although United States privacy laws exhibit different levels of stringency, and HIPAA is
often considered one of the most stringent, Price and Rai's discussion of the healthcare space
should explore healthcare-specific privacy.
118. 45 C.F.R. §§ 16 4 .5 o2(b), 16 4 .51 4 (d)(1) (2020).
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future data use restricted to what has been communicated to clinical trial

subjects,"9 patient data use under HIPAA is substantially more limited.121
HIPAA applies to statutorily defined covered entities, which include
HCPs. Certain rules under HIPAA apply when HCPs engage in electronic
transmission of Protected Health Information, which is broadly defined as
health information collected by a covered entity and transmitted
electronically. The Health Information Technology and Electronic
Communications for Health Act of 2oog ("HITECH") extended HIPAA to
include business associates, or third parties of covered entities receiving
Protected Health Information. HIPAA statutorily requires that covered
entities execute a business associate agreement in contracts with business
associates, which effectually exports HIPAA's provisions to the third party,
regardless of where the third party is geographically located.
HIPAA conditions data use on what is disclosed in the Notice of Privacy
Practices presented to the patient. These data uses are limited to use for
treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.21 In the event data will not be
used for these purposes, or for purposes not consistent with data
minimization, an additional authorization (with explicit consent of the
patient) must be executed.122 The authorization document itself limits any use
of protected health information to the additional purposes and third parties
specified in the authorization form, subject to a specific time period or until
a terminating event occurs. 23 HIPAA authorization to date has not been
designed for broad and unlimited duration data sharing.
In the event that an AI technology provider is selling direct to a consumer
without submitting an insurance claim, and not selling a product or service to
an HCP, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is responsible for enforcing
against unfair or deceptive trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The FTC has not passed specific rules regarding data minimization, notice
and consent, or authorization. However, the Fair Information Practice

119. Id. 5 4 6.1 16(b); Kate Fultz Hollis, To Share or Not to Share: Ethical Acquisition and Use of
Medical Data, 2016 AMIA JOINT SUMMITS ON TRANSLATIONAL Sci. PROc. 420, 424-25. Notably,
additional data use beyond what is included in informed consent forms in a clinical setting can
be referred to the Institutional Review Board. See InstitutionalReview Boards and the IIIPAA Privacy
Rule, U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH

&

HUM. SERVS.

NAT'L

INSTS.

tps://privacvruleandresearch.nih.gov/irbandprivacyrule.asp

HEALTH

(July

8,

2004), ht

[https://perma.cc/DgRD-RRJW].

120. 45 C.F.R. @@ i6 4 .5 o8(b) (4), 164.502(a) (i). It should be noted that when federal
funding applies, data deposit requirements may provide some relief from data use limitations. See
W. Nicholson Price II, Rachel Sachs & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, New Innovation Models in Medical A],
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2o22) (manuscript at 40), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=3 7 8 3 8 7 9 [https://perma.cc/S2JE-HX8U]. However, at least at this time, data
collected after an AI product has been commercialized generally will not be included in such a
mandate.
121.

122.

45 C.F.R. § 164-520(a)-(b).
45 C.F.R. §§ 16 4 .5 08(a)-(b), 164.532(a)-(c). A covered entity, such as a healthcare

provider or health plan administrator may not condition the provision of healthcare or coverage
on execution of an authorization. Any consent must be freely given.

123.

Id.

§§ 164-508(a)-(b).
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Principles ("FIPPs"), which are non-binding guidance that inform FTC
enforcement, do establish recommended guidance to use notice and consent.
The effect is that complying with such guidance operates to avoid potential
liability under the FTC Act.
The general outcome of HIPAA statutory requirements and the FTC's
enforcement prerogative is that data collection must be minimized and
specific to the uses defined at the time of collection, data use must be able to
be terminated at a point in time, and patients may be required in some
circumstances. In all cases, previously given consent may be revoked.
Practically, this has a dramatic effect on subsequent data use and sharing.
First, privacy notices must be reasonably specific as it describes how data will
be used, which will likely be fairly restrictive, reducing the usability of data
previously collected for any other purposes. Under HIPAA, uses that are
beyond treatment, payment, and healthcare operations, as may be the case
with AI technology, must be specifically described in an authorization form,
which may be difficult to execute, easy to terminate, and also specifically
tailored. If consent is revoked, then data previously collected may not be
reused for other purposes.
The narrowly tailored aspect of privacy notices and a patient or
consumer's ability to revoke consent means that data previously collected may
be prohibited from use for other purposes, or shared with other parties, by
law. Moreover, the ability for a patient to revoke consent means that data
previously supplied also not be used for any additional uses or shared with
other parties. For protected health information collected under HIPAA,
authorization may be revoked at any time.
Privacy law, therefore, functions as a substantial barrier to data use and
sharing. Because data collection may be minimized-restricted to the
purposes specified in the notice of privacy practices, privacy, notice, or
authorization, and consent may be revoked, limiting further data use-privacy
law and data essentialism in AI are at odds.
2. Clearing Privacy Obstacles
One option for overcoming privacy obstacles while protecting individual
privacy and promoting data use and sharing is for organizations to invest in
de-identification

technologies.124

Although

the

United

States

has

not

established de-identification standards in other sectors, the De-identification
Safe Harbor rule-established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") for entities obligated to follow HIPAA-permits broad data
use when a data set has 18 identifiers removed or when expert determination
has rendered statistically low risk to an individual.2m In both cases,

124.
Using De-identijied Ilealth Infinnation to Imfnove Care: What, iow and Why, PRACTICE
FUSION (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.practicefusion.com/blog/using-de-identified-patient-data-

to [https://perma.cc/HgGL-FBDY].
125.
Guidance RegardingMethods fr De-identificationof Protected Jfealth Jnformation in Accordance
with the Health Insutanre Partabilily and Arcounability Art (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DP'r or
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the

Safe Harbor
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provision when

1

they

independently know that individuals can actually be identified from the data
0

set.2

On its face, AI might function well using de-identified data only.
However, AI's power is in its ability to generate broad decisions and adapt
those decisions to an individual, or personalization.'27 For this reason, Al is
inherently personalized when it is being used to offer differentiated service or
treatment, making full de-identification of data sets nearly impossible while
retaining the efficacy of AI for tailored medicine.123 Unfortunately, if AT
cannot be effectively de-identified to an acceptable risk standard, privacy
restrictions remain.
Al use might actually destroy de-identification, too, through
reidentification.12) Generally, the more data one has, especially diverse data,
the easier it is to identify an individual.
And the computing power of AI, the
same computing power that can identify new insights in a wide range of data
elements can similarly use that computing power to reidentify an
individual,' especially with the introduction of additional data. Consider, for
example, a data set that includes de-identified medical data such as age,
gender, medical diagnosis, general physical location, and physical descriptors
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/s
pecial-topics/de-identification/index.html [https://perma.cc/U6LM-F W].
74
126.
Id. It should be noted that a data set's ability to identify an individual is referenced with
respect to actual knowledge, rather than inferential knowledge. For example, inferential
knowledge deals in probabilities, rather than actual knowledge. For this reason, typical big data
problems regarding identifiability may not necessarily invalidate the Safe Harbor provision.
Indeed, inferential knowledge of a person's identity as well as sensitive information about them
(which may subject that person to unfairness or discrimination based on that information) may
subject that person to additional risk of harm. However, inferences are not objective

identifiability.
127. Charlotte A. Tschider, AI's Legitimate Interest: Towards a Public Benefit Privacy Model, 2 I
HousI. J. HEAI I I L. & Po t'i (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 33-34), https://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 3 7 2 5 9 3 3 [https://perma.cc/ 4 4 GN-MXB6]; James Warner,
Thanks to Al, Medical Treatments Are Becoming More Personalized, TNW (Dec. 1 1, 2019), https://then
extweb.com/news/thanks-to-ai-medical-treatments-are-becoming-more-personalized

[https://p

erma.cc/W2V3-PNLB].
128. Tschider, supra note 127, at 33--35129.
Boris Lubarsky, Re-ldenlificaion of "AnonymizedDala, t GEO. L. TuCin. REV. 202, 208-12
(2017).
130.
W. Nicholson Price II, ProblematicInteractions Between Al and Ifealth Privacy, UTAH L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2-4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?absract_id
-3797161 [https://perma.cc/TS6W-gJF 4 ]; Mark Gibbs, MJT ResearchersShow You Can Be Identified
by a Just Few Data Points,NETWORK WORLD (Jan. 30, 2015, i1: 4 7 AM), https://www.networkworld.
com/article/ 287839 4 /mit-researchers-show-you-can-be-identified-by-a-just-few-data-points.html
[https://perma.cc/9YC- 5 SK 7 ]. This is not to say that de-identification, even of big data that still
retain some identifiability is not a good strategy-it does reduce privacy risk to individuals.
However, with big data feeding powerful Al, it may not be a panacea. ANN CAVOUKIAN & DANIEL

CASTRO, BIG DATA AND INNOVATION, SEItTING T It, RECORD STRAIGI IT: DV-IDENTIFICAIION Dogs
WORK 1-2 (2014), https://www2.itif.org/2o i 4 -big-data-deidentification.pdf [https://perma.cc/

8HRG-ZH 5 2].
131.

See Price, supranote

130,

at 2-3.
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but does not include specific medical record number, date of birth, or address

but nevertheless can identify an individual in a big data set.132
It is possible, but not likely probable, that an individual will be readily
identified from these identifiers. However, if such data are coupled with the
identities of friends, places the individual frequents and what they buy, or
other de-identified data about the individual's family, it may become easier to
identify the individual. To date, HIPAA does not explicitly bar reidentification
as a barrier to safe harbor status.33
For clinical health data, the concerns may be even more significant.134 By
harnessing the power of AI to analyze diverse and large data sets, the AI can
often identify the individual from previously de-identified and publicly
available data.' 3
The need for large and diverse data sources to feed machine learning
applications means that de-identified data will likely be combined with other
data sources, such as publicly available data or other de-identified data
received from another entity.3 6 This means that even if data can be deidentified, in large data sets coupled with sophisticated AI algorithms, data
are more likely to be able to identify an individual.37 Therefore, making data
broadly available and making AI explanations more transparent actually
could result in a greater probability of identifiability and greater risk to
individuals using these systems, which is exactly what transparency advocates
aim to solve.
Although much of this section has focused on individually identifiable
data elements, advanced algorithms may also reveal cumulative data insights,
or inferences.13 8 Even when an organization has legitimately collected and
i '32. Liangyuan Na et al., Feasibility ofReidentifying Individuals in Large National PhysicalActivity
Data Sets from Which Protected !Health Information las Been Removed with Use of Machine Learning
JAMA NETwORK OPEN, Dec. 2o18, at 1, 2-3.
133.
See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 125. In contrast, the General
Data Protection Regulation in the EU and its predecessor, the Data Protection Directive, both
established an "impossibility of reidentification" standard for anonymization, an alternative
standard to de-identification. This means that the standard for big data sets using AI will likely be
more restrictive in the EU and not apply to U.S. HIPAA protected health information. Opinion
annex, at 27-28 (Apr. 10, 2014)
05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, 0829/1 4 /EN,
https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-2g/documentation/opinion-recommendation/f

iles/2014/wp216_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRL-YRCY].
134.
See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidenlification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in
Research?, 10 AM. J. BiOi:iiIics, Sept. 2010, at 3 (concluding that even use of deidentified data
pose a privacy risk).
135.
Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Ali Farzanehfar, Julien Hendrickx & Luc Rocher, Solving
Artificial Intelligence's Privacy Problem, 17 FIELD ACTIONS SCI. REPS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 8o, 81-83
(2017).

136.
See Lubarsky, supranote 129, at 211.
137. Indeed, prior to current big data and Al use, 63 percent of the population could be
identified by a combination of gender, date of birth, and zip code, despite these being "indirect
identifiers." Id. at 203.
138. Manish Prabhu, Security & Privacy Considerations in Artificial Intelligence & Machine
Learning-Par-6:Up Close with Privacy, TOWARDS DATASCI. (Feb. 8, 2019), https://towardsdatasci
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maintained a big data set to feed Al, and even if the big data set contains
public and de-identified data, advanced algorithms may nevertheless be able
to identify information about an individual in new or different ways, when
generalized data are applied in a personalized way, to an individual.39
De-identification could reasonably protect individual privacy while
permitting data use and sharing, but big data coupled with Al technologies
could result in the creation of inferences that are accurate with respect to data
already removed from the data set, such as race, or create brand new
inferences not independently captured anywhere in the original data set
(such as employment status). If the United States mandates direct
explanation for AI decisions, the explanations could, in cases where AI
developers do not guard against inferences in their design, reveal sensitive
details about an individual.'v' For example, a patient's disability status may
have been removed from a data set but prescriptions and durable medical
supplies could inferentially establish a patient's disability status. And, if
enough data are collected about the patient from insurance data, doctors'
visits, and public data sources, even if the data are de-identified, other
information might be gleaned, too, such as race.
Ultimately, de-identification could promote data use and sharing by
reducing risk to patient privacy. Unfortunately, identifiable data are often
necessary for the development of personalized AI technologies, and,
moreover, de-identified data sets will likely create inferences anyway. While
de-identification is an important tool for information privacy, it is not
designed to completely resolve key tensions between privacy law and AI
transparency goals.
C.

JUSTIFYING TRANSPARENCY

To achieve "transparency," technical and legal opacity cannot make it
difficult to ascertain information about an AI product or service. For
situations where transparency may be more necessary, as described in Part I,
such as when AI decisions result in significant impacts to a person's legal
interests, transparency is exceptionally important.'4'
To determine whether overcoming legal opacity is justified, it is
important to revisit why AI transparency is desirable. Al drives calls for

ence.com/security-privacy-in-artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-part-6-up-close-with-privacy
-3ae 5 3 3 4 d 4 d 4 b [https://perma.cc/L95Y-FSAN]; see Tschider, supra note 72, at 98-99; Barocas
& Selbst, supra note 72, at 68i, 688.

139.

See generally REVA SCHWARTZ, LEANN DOwN, ADAM JONAS & ELHAM TABASSI, NAT'L INST.

OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 1 270, A PROPOSAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING BIAS IN

ARTIFICIAL INIKIIGEKNCE (2021), https://nvpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.
SP.12 7 o-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP 7 Y-QJRL] (describing the dangers of bias in AI systems
that can have certain negative consequences on an individual).
140.
Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Righio
I Reasonable Inferences: Re-thinking Data
Prolection Law in the Age of Big Daa and Al, 2019 COI1M. BUS. L. REV. 494, 543-48 (2019)
(proposing a right to know and rectify inferences).
141.
See Citron & Pasquale, supranote 15, at 20-29.
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transparency in a variety of contexts because: 1) Al is a comparatively new

technology which socially we do not completely understand;12 2) in complex
AI, decisions are made by the AI or at least partially by the AI (causing
inherent issues related to trustworthiness);'43 3) some of the scenarios where
AI will be used have the potential to detrimentally affect many people
simultaneously;144 and 4) this detriment could affect individual lives
dramatically, as in discriminatory impact or safety issues.'n
For Al systems to be reliable, non-discriminatory, and safe, organizations
producing AI must have access to extremely large, diverse, representative,
non-discriminatory, well-organized, and structured data sets.146 Data volume
and diversity are not optional, but rather essential, for safe and fair AI.
Therefore, reducing the probability of discrimination and safety risks is
improved by more, rather than less data. 47Privacy goals of restrictions in data
collection, use, and sharing, then, unfortunately run at cross-purposes to goals
of reliability, non-discrimination, and safety. At its most rudimentary
explanation, data essentialism prompts broader collection and data use to
train safe and fair AI; data protection urges minimization and adds
8
considerable layers of administrative burden to collect and use data.14
For example, imagine a new lending system, created by a third-party Al
developer and used by a significant number of banks, that determines
(without the involvement of a banker) whether an individual qualifies for a
loan. The inputs that determine who qualifies are unavailable to both the
individual and the banks using (and licensing) the system. The data used to
train the system to recognize "good loan candidate" are similarly not available.
It is unknown what volume and diversity of data were used to create the
system, and whether such data are representative of a diverse community of
loan applicants. Indeed, most of the third party's employees were not involved
in developing the Al, and the Al is so complex that the developers don't
exactly know how the loan recommendations are being rendered. Although
the loan system seems to produce the correct "goal" numbers for qualified

142.
See Mark MacCarthy, A [Needs More Regulation, Not Less, BROOKINGS (Mar. 9, 2020), https:
//www.brookings.edu/research/ai-needs-more-regulation-not-less
[https://perma.cc/ZD 4 5 -TV
PB].

143. Assisted, Augmented and Autonomous: The 3 Flavours of AT Decisions, TGDAILY (June 28,
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loan recipients for each bank, lending activities have recently been criticized

for biased algorithmic loan denial.'n
How might issues like this be resolved? Presumably access to more and
diverse data would likely make AI like this fairer and more representative, yet
the tool opacity and legal opacity of this scenario creates many hurdles to
overcome before an organization could even begin to defend its Al decision.
The challenge to achieving some degree of transparency in Al
technologies and their underlying data is three-fold: 1) trade secrecy of at
least part of the AI technology; 2) contractual language prohibiting disclosure
of confidential information about the AI technology as well as limitations on
personal information use and sharing; and 3) privacy laws limiting personal
information collection, use, and sharing. Any one of these sources of legal
opacity could create a barrier to transparency goals. Together, they are nearly
impossible to surmount. Any calls for transparency, especially innovation
through data use and sharing, cannot be accomplished in the system as it
stands.
IV. TRANSPARENCY: AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?

It might seem easy to demand that AI technology and underlying data
should be open and available, and certainly there may be situations that
demand transparency or explainability. However, broad advocacy of openness
fails to appreciate not only the difficulty and sometimes impossibility of
making complex, non-intuitive systems explainable, but also it neglects the
United States' strong legal protection of trade secrecy, private contract
provisions, and privacy law protections. Rather than advocate for general
transparency and data availability, we should balance various interests to
ensure all participants'-organizations, researchers, and individualsinterests are advanced.3o
Price and Rai make excellent points regarding big data reuse and nonintuitiveness explanations in a variety of situations-incentives rather than
mandates in many situations might help to navigate the legal quandary posed
by a strong recognition of private contracting and trade secrecy in the United
States. Perhaps, however, complementary legal models might be used to
satisfy distinct policy goals.
I suggest that any mandated disclosure, explanation, or expanded data
use or sharing, might first be explored contextually. For example,
applications in healthcare might well demand more comprehensive
disclosure due to health and safety risks, as well as potential discriminatory
impact, than Al supporting a consumer retail product like a coffee maker. I
also suggest that depending on what might be disclosed, such as data,

149.
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algorithmic explanation, or process and system details, the United States
might consider different policy approaches. These recommendations only
scratch the surface of the comprehensive law and policy discussions to come
and are intended to encourage greater conversation on these topics.
A. PROMOTING DATA DiSCLOSuRE

Price and Rai describe the importance of curated, labeled,
representative, and voluminous data availability for innovation in Al, a goal
championed by the past three administrations.'5' Without access to broad,
diverse data sets, any number of AI applications will be less representative of
the communities in which they will be used. Data, especially well-organized
and coded data, are the cornerstone of contemporary AI machine learning
systems. In addition to Price and Rai's data disclosure public funding policy
lever, privacy considerations should evolve to maximize use of these data while
simultaneously protecting individuals.
Twin aims could assist in encouraging data disclosure while reducing
privacy impacts. First, privacy laws like HIPAA could evolve to balance data
minimization and data maximization, data essentialism. Data minimization
could be construed by the Office for Civil Rights, the enforcement arm of
HHS, to include justifiable data collection and use for effective AI
applications: namely, to improve Al function safety and fairness in the public
interest.5 2 Additionally, privacy notices could include directly notifying
individuals that AI systems are being used and explicitly limit personal
information uses to improved functionality and fairness. Consistent with data
essentialism goals, data uses that primarily benefit commercial enterprise
rather than the individual or patient would be prohibited, for example, more
effective marketing techniques and other uses that would not be in the
legitimate interest of individuals.153
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this could mean that data previously

collected could be subject to a broader public health exception to the
requirement for authorization in data sharing. A HIPAA public health
exception applies when disclosing to a public health authority or when a
public health authority directs disclosure to a foreign government.34
However, it might be possible to interpret such discussion for public health
activities sanctioned by a public health authority, such as the U.S.
government,

or with the Office for Civil Rights'

("OCR")

enforcement

discretion.155 With this approach, the OCR, perhaps collaborating across the
FDA, the division of HHS that regulates medical device safety and efficacy,
could establish that public health exceptions apply to AI fairness and safety
efforts. In the interest of public health, specifically for improving and running
A, the OCR and FDA could declare data sharing for at least some limited
purposes and to a necessary extent, permissible under a public interest
exception.
Other sectors could follow a similar path. Although healthcare adopts an
authorization approach, most sectors follow a general consent approach. For
these sectors, consent could be waived when data use is in the best interest of
an individual, a class, or a community of individuals, or legitimateinterest.5 In
short, because further data use primarily benefits a defined group and not the
organization collecting data, such use could be justified.157 In this model of
waiving consent, legitimate interest is a useful alternative specifically because
it substitutes a collective benefit model for a consent model-data could be
used or transferred in the event that substantial benefit to individuals
significantly outweighs benefit to an organization.' For example, additional
processing of data to make better, fairer Al lending software will likely benefit
a substantial number of consumers.
Moreover, significant privacy barriers concern the degree to which data
are actually capable of identifying an individual, exposing that individual to
some harm. To minimize risk to individuals, the United States should invest
in more standardization of de-identification techniques for AI data sets that

154-
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render data useful and effectively low risk to patients and other individuals.

Although the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") has
created some tools and use cases for organizations to review, NIST could
either create legally qualifying procedures for achieving self-de-identification
or certify third parties to provide these services.1M9 For the healthcare sector,
the De-identification Safe Harbor provision should be revised, building on
NIST guidance, to promote privacy-oriented data-sharing strategies with little
to no privacy risk to individuals. 5 1 Together with more expansive
considerations of alternative justifications for further data use and transfer,
such as public health exceptions or legitimate interest, this model could both
promote beneficial data use while minimizing risk to individuals.
While these proposed changes do not eliminate contractual limitations
on data use, it could encourage the creation of centralized data lakes derived
from identifiable data, reducing impediments to data access. For example, an
organization receiving identifiable data from a customer could de-identify
those data and use them for additional purposes, so long as the deidentification activities were properly executed and legally defensible.
Resulting data lake infrastructure and virtual AI workspaces could be financed
by the federal government, as Price and Rai suggest.' 6 However, any access to
common data and workspaces should be subject to a common contributionbased contractual obligation where participants must register their use and
deposit their own de-identified, labeled, and curated data sets. This model
could create a reciprocal sharing arrangement, similar to the contractual
obligation to deposit data in government repositories as a condition of
receiving federal funding without requiring the government to fund data
creation long-term. Reciprocal arrangements and government incentives could
indeed help to overcome contractual limitations by promoting more frequent
execution of data sharing arrangements, especially if health care providers,
for example, are not concerned about potential privacy issues.
B. INCENTIVIZING DISCLOSURE OFAE TLCHNOLOGY

Organizations, especially for-profit corporations and start-ups, may not
be encouraged to disclose details of their inventions to competitors.
Specifically, these organizations may wish to protect this information as trade
secrets or bar any independent disclosure under contractual confidentiality
terms. Given the strength of trade secrecy in the United States and the
prevalent use of confidentiality agreements, it is unlikely that forced trade
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secret and confidentiality destruction through compelled disclosure will be

successful. Instead, the United States might consider other incentive-based
models, as Price and Rai recommend.16 2
Innovation in AI does require technology detail sharing, not just data
sharing. AI training techniques, validation and feedback loop engineering, or
even infrastructure approaches to improve performance could revolutionize
how organizations develop Al, the key to safe, fair AI.J
Although data and
algorithms are important, the techniques and approaches used to create the
system itself will likely advance the field at a far greater rate, so long as
sufficiently specific details are available.
Given the existing challenges in drafting patents, the United States could
consider alternatives for incentivizing disclosure while simultaneously
offering some protection for organizations disclosing these details. For
example, an alternative to a patent that operates like a limited patent, such as
market exclusivity used for generic drugs, might effectively provide enough
competitive cover for organizations creating innovative technologies while
promoting disclosure.
Similar to reforms, Price and Rai recommend the product-by-process
approach to patenting;'¼ additionally, the United States might also consider
an alternative patent with a shorter monopoly period and more detailed claim
requirements. 6 5 Either of these solutions could prevent competitors from
duplicating technology for a limited time period, while simultaneously
disclosing the invention, something trade secrecy cannot provide.
Organizations could also deposit training data (or at a minimum, the data
elements used for training data), host trained machine learning models, and
capture feedback to meaningfully animate review and oversight processes.6
A hosted environment with this information could create a dynamic, rather
than static, patent file. 6 7
Any of these approaches could include a live hosting environment for the
algorithm, which simultaneously demonstrates that the technology works
(overcoming enablement concerns if relying on a version of a patent) and
promotes adverse testing by competitors.i5 If advanced machine learning
algorithms are used, it will be difficult to reverse engineer these algorithms,
and a credentialed log-on system with associated validation of qualified
i62.

See id. at 801-04 (describing potential changes to patent law that would promote more

detailed disclosure in a product-by-process model).
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entities should prevent bad actors from accessing the system.'9 In addition,
access to a wide variety of AI algorithms (and the ability to test them!) might
inspire different or more AI development.
Such an environment could be managed by a governmental agency like
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or perhaps another independent
agency. A disclosure and hosting environment could also permit customer
and patient advocacy groups to give ratings, offer comments, or promote
suggestions on how to make these systems safer and fairer. Indeed, such a
model could enable those affected by or scored under automated decisioning
(or advocates for individuals) to score the scorer.'7' If participation in such
an environment is optional, organizations could be persuaded to participate
if they are offered some protection from lawsuits or at least a rebuttable
presumption of reasonable behavior, similar to information sharing in a
cybersecurity context.'7
C. AIDISCLOSURE IN RiGUtI TORY RVIEW

Although incentivizing data sharing through government sponsorship
and encouraging disclosure through patents might offer significant progress
for transparency goals, some legal situations will simply require more detailed
forms of explanation than patent information or data deposits can provide.
Specifically, these situations may call for mandated disclosure that leverages
existing legal protections to minimize excessive disclosure that can harm
organizational interests.
Price and Rai recommend that an alternative machine learning
algorithm could be used to explain the algorithm(s) in question in the event
administrative agencies, such as the FDA or qualified third parties, are
positioned to complete ex ante invention reviews.172 Ex ante reviews would
occur prior to an AI product hitting the market and are valuable because they
could prevent potential safety or unfairness issues. For AI, the FDA has
promoted a Pre-Certification program for ex ante review that could, if
mandated, require organizations to disclose information about the quality
process for creating AI, but not the details of the AI technology itself.
Although I do not share Price and Rai's optimism about the FDA's Pre-
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Certification Program's ability to prevent downstream issues,73 explanation
could be useful for administrative review.
Disclosure of Al technology details and sample explanations could
reduce the likelihood of safety or unfairness issues downstream. Moreover,
the FDA has actually been criticized for its non-disclosure of confidential
information disclosed to it in FDA review processes in downstream litigation,
illustrating that confidentiality or trade secret destruction risks for ex ante
reviews are very low. For example, an AI-enabled surgical robot would likely
receive a comprehensive FDA review. If the FDA will determine whether such
a robot can be marketed, they will likely need to determine whether such a
system is safe and efficacious. To do so will likely require some details of the
technology and how it renders safe and effective decisions and, for example,
whether such decisions are disproportionately more safe and effective for
certain communities than for others. As is typical in all FDA reviews, the
details of the review process will likely be kept confidential, including sample
explanations. Explanation might be even more crucial after a significant
problem is discovered.
Organizations that have received FDA approval or have received an
alternative path for marketing a product are responsible for adverse event
reporting or a continuing obligation to report events that seriously impact the
safety of a previously reviewed product.' When reporting injuries or property
damage to an agency, like the FDA, in a medical device report,75 the FDA
could require organizations to conduct a root cause analysis to determine how
the Al algorithm(s)' decision or resulting function resulted in bodily injury,
property damage, or discriminatory impact and, after a reasonable time,
disclose the corrective measures taken.17 6 Co-developed algorithms-some
that function and some that disentangle the decisions (such as Price and Rai's
machine learning algorithms)-could streamline this process.
It should be noted that of course, other sectors do not have strong ex ante
and continuous monitoring obligations required by law. For this reason, the
FDA actually has an opportunity to do much more to promote safety and
fairness in AI than other administrative agencies can. However, other sectors
could rely on incentivized disclosure, including live algorithmic hosting to
promote broad reviews.
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D. AI EXPLANATI0N IN L1TuGATI0N

Promoting ex ante regulatory incentives and requirements will likely serve
a better function than completely relying on litigation to reveal AI technology
safety and fairness issues. AI technologies are typically centrally managed and
may make decisions, opaquely, that affect a large number of individuals
simultaneously. 177 For this reason, the potential issues are not just significant
to an individual, they may be unavoidable to anyone using the technology.178
However, there are many situations where transparency will be necessary for
litigation and potential legal recovery, as well.
For product safety torts or discrimination causes of action, explanation
could also be necessary, at least in discovery. For example, a consumer using
an AI-enabled home thermostat could bring a cause of action when the
thermostat malfunctions, increasing the temperature threshold until a
furnace overheats, starting a serious fire. In a case like this, how might a
consumer actually demonstrate that the thermostat caused the fire without
information about how the thermostat's Al functions? In a case where an
employer AI system rated facial expressions in a videotaped interview and
failed to pass on interviewers with a specific skin tone or accent, how might
any information be gleaned as to how the Al system failed if disclosure is not
possible? In both of these cases, it may even be desirable to explain the specific
A algorithmic decision that caused the behavior harming these plaintiffs.
Fortunately, courts have effectively managed confidential and trade
secret information for a long time, and it may be possible for courts to require
an explanation in a way that protects an AI technology innovator while
simultaneously enabling legitimate cases to go forward. The law has long
recognized that information is not simply public or private, it may be available
to some individuals or organizations while simultaneously unavailable to
others. 79 Information disclosure does not necessarily destroy its status; rather,
intermediary states are common and expected. In short, informational status
is a dynamic, rather than static, state.
One option is Court review of trade secrets in camera or with experts
bound by confidentiality agreements. During an in-camera review, privileged
or confidential information, including trade secrets, may be reviewed without
disclosing them to the public by discussing in chambers or submitting
evidence in sealed, marked, envelopes and in preapproved online

177.
For example, cybersecurity risks wherein a cyberattacker may make changes to a system
will likely affect the system holistically, not just one patient. See Tschider, supranote 144, at 182,
205.
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environments. 8 ,1 Situations that could compromise personal privacy are
sometimes also protected. This model of review for AI algorithmic function
certainly could preserve trade secrecy for portions of the invention that
require protection while providing evidence that could reveal intentionality,
disparate impact, or factual causation. Another option might be to require
disclosure only when the plaintiff has met some burden. For example, Al
technology safety and fairness issues are likely to affect a large number of
individuals at one time and for that reason are poised to frequently operate
as class-action lawsuits. For this reason, courts could potentially permit a
showing of causation circumstantially, such as use of an AI system and a
specific group of people who used the system and experienced the same or
similar injuries. For example, AI-based class-actions could be scrutinized more
heavily for meeting the commonality requirement but allowed some flexibility
in meeting the proximate cause prong for a products liability case. Permitting
some flexibility in such a finding (when proximate cause may be nearly
impossible with substantial Al opacity and lack of explanation), could shift
the burden to a defendant, who may be required to explain Al decisions
within the context of the case. This model could also leverage alternatives to
public disclosure in court.
V. CONCLUSION

Innovation is a centrally important goal in the development of Al
positioned to transform our lives. In sectors like healthcare, Al systems have
the potential to radically improve health outcomes, reduce costs, and
promote self-sufficiency. Without innovation, the promise and opportunity of
A will never be realized. Discrimination, safety, and privacy risks do, however,
threaten the potential benefits of such innovation.
Although beyond the scope of this Response, it is crucial to determine
whether transparency to address these issues is: 1) possible; and 2) if it is
possible, whether it is useful; and 3) if it is possible, and it is useful, whether
organizations should be required to disclose confidential or secret
information about AI technologies. Specifically, in considering whether
transparency is desirable, it is crucial to understand that legal opacity presents
a substantial impediment to transparency goals. Because legal opacity
functions for many justifiable purposes, transparency goals should consider
to what extent these legitimate legal practices and legal requirements should
be limited in their application.
AI is currently being used in nearly every sector, from high-stakes
decisions like how an insulin pump will function or appropriate government
entitlements to comparatively lower-stakes decisions like the optimal
temperature for my home to reduce energy costs. Therefore, transparency
requirements should accommodate differing sector risk profiles, reducing
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disclosure requirements for low-risk product and services, while prompting
greater disclosure for higher-risk and higher-benefit AI. The purpose of
specific types of disclosures is important, too, such as whether the United
States aims to create safe and fair AI technologies, whether the United States
desires to promote Al innovation through data use and sharing, or if the U.S.
judicial system wants to facilitate legitimate and lawful plaintiff remedies for
AI injuries.
Our current legal ecosystem, operating in favor of opacity, threatens
good-faith efforts to bring greater investment, adoption, and confidence in
AI technologies. Solving this problem requires a nuanced and combined
approach using a variety of policy levers simultaneously to address these
complexities while promoting information sharing. By addressing these
perspectives contextually and encouraging disclosure of what is specifically
needed to attain a particular goal, the United States can promote better Al
systems while protecting the organizations developing them.

